Wednesday, December 17, 2008

Obama Team Has Forged Another Link With Clintons

The New York Times
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December 17, 2008

Obama Team Has Forged Another Link With Clintons

WASHINGTON — It’s official. The old Clinton gang really is back together again. Answering the phones these days for the co-chairman of President-elect Barack Obama’s transition, John D. Podesta, is none other than Betty Currie.

Emerging from retirement in southern Maryland to volunteer at Obama headquarters, Ms. Currie was the personal secretary to President Bill Clinton, who became caught up in an independent counsel investigation into his trysts with the White House intern Monica Lewinsky. Since leaving the White House, Ms. Currie, 69, has shied from publicity and kept a low profile in Hollywood, Md., where she lives with her husband, Bob, and Socks, the presidential cat, which she took with her after Mr. Clinton left office.

Ms. Currie, who works with local nonprofit organizations and serves on the Alcohol Beverage Board of St. Mary’s County, declined to discuss her work for Mr. Obama or her recent life, citing a transition office policy against volunteers giving interviews.

Compelled to testify to a grand jury five times about Mr. Clinton’s relationship with Ms. Lewinsky, Ms. Currie is widely admired in Clinton circles for her loyalty and effectiveness.

Mr. Podesta, who was Mr. Clinton’s last White House chief of staff, said it was natural for him to call Ms. Currie back to service.

“Of course I asked her because in the 30 years we have worked together, I have never known anyone with more grace, dedication and public spirit than Betty,” he said. “And she has one mean Rolodex.”

Ms. Currie is the latest familiar face from the Clinton era to assist Mr. Obama’s team. In addition to Mr. Podesta, Mr. Obama’s chief of staff, his White House counsel and his economics, energy and environmental advisers all served in the Clinton administration. So did most of the cabinet officers he has chosen and many of the transition aides conducting agency reviews. And the newly designated secretary of state is Hillary Rodham Clinton.

A longtime secretary in agencies like the Peace Corps, Ms. Currie left government to work for Democratic presidential campaigns in 1984 and 1988 before joining Mr. Clinton in 1992. She then served in Mr. Clinton’s transition until he picked her to be his secretary. She stayed through all eight years, calmly managing the intersection of power and policy.

Other Obama aides said they expected Ms. Currie to help out through the transition but not to return to the White House after the inauguration.

Ms. Currie has kept in touch with the Clintons and donated $750 to Mrs. Clinton’s campaign for the Democratic presidential nomination this year. When she ran into Mrs. Clinton last spring, she told a writer from Southern Maryland Newspapers, Mrs. Clinton asked about Socks.

U.S. News & World Report has reported that Socks, now 19, has cancer.


Wednesday, November 05, 2008

NY Fed hires former Bear Stearns chief risk officer

Tue Nov 4, 2008 9:29am EST

NEW YORK, Nov 4 (Reuters) - The Federal Reserve Bank of New York has hired the former chief risk officer of Bear Stearns Cos, Michael Alix, to advise on bank supervision, according to a release in the Fed's Web site.

Alix will serve as a senior advisor to William Rutledge in the Bank Supervision Group and his appointment is effective Nov. 3, according to the release dated Oct. 31

At Bear Stearns, an investment bank that collapsed in March and has become hallmark of the global credit crisis, Alix served as chief risk officer from 2006 to 2008 and global head of credit risk management from 1996 to 2006.

Morgan Stanley's Bonuses Get Saved By You and Me: Jonathan Weil


Commentary by Jonathan Weil


Oct. 21 (Bloomberg) -- Wall Street had it wrong: An investment bank's most precious asset isn't the army of employees who head down the elevators each day. It's the paychecks they take with them out the door.

You can imagine the devilish grins on the faces of Morgan Stanley employees last week, after the Treasury Department said it would pump $10 billion into the bank. Not only did we, the taxpayers, save their company, with the help of a Japanese bank named Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group Inc. More importantly, we funded their 2008 bonus pool.

Morgan Stanley has accrued $10.7 billion of employee- compensation expense this year, almost twice as much as its pretax earnings. The vast majority of this remuneration hasn't been paid yet. Now it probably will be, assuming the firm survives through next month. Meantime, Morgan Stanley's stock- market value has dropped $34.7 billion, to $21 billion, since the company's fiscal year began.

The rescue of Morgan Stanley's bonus pool is an unpleasant downside of Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson's decision to inject $250 billion of cash into U.S. banks in exchange for preferred stock. It is one thing for a company to pay much more to employees than it earns for its shareholders. It's quite another to keep doing it while receiving taxpayer bailout bucks.

Before securities firms were public companies, a brokerage in need of capital would have called on its partners to pony up. That's how it still works at private partnerships, such as law firms. The reason they don't get taxpayer rescues is they can't credibly threaten to take down the world's financial system.

Global Threats

Morgan Stanley can. So can Paulson's old firm, Goldman Sachs Group Inc., which also is getting a $10 billion infusion from Treasury. Year-to-date, Goldman has reported $11.4 billion of compensation expense, almost twice its $5.9 billion of pretax earnings. During the same span, its market capitalization has fallen $41.7 billion, to $57.7 billion.

Morgan Stanley needed Treasury's cash. Goldman didn't, but got it anyway. As long as Paulson can't think of any better ideas, the government will keep throwing money at an industry that pays too many people more than they're worth, to perform services the world has too much of already. The bright side is we avoid a global meltdown, for now.

Here's all you really need to know to see who lost and who benefited most at the Five Families of Wall Street, otherwise known as Goldman, Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch, Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns. From the start of their 2004 fiscal years through yesterday, the big standalone investment banks lost about $83 billion of stock-market value. During the same period, they reported about $239 billion of employee-compensation expense.

Lined Pockets

So, for every dollar of shareholder value destroyed, the employees got paid almost three. Only a sliver of that money went to chief executives such as Goldman's Lloyd Blankfein, who got a $70.3 million package last year, and Lehman's Richard Fuld, who made $34.4 million. Morgan Stanley's John Mack, by the way, received $1.6 million for 2007.

The Five Families -- now down to just Goldman and Morgan Stanley -- weren't alone. Citigroup Inc., which is getting a $25 billion injection from Treasury, has reported $139.3 billion of compensation expense since the start of 2004, more than double its $62.8 billion of pretax earnings. Its market cap, by comparison, has declined by about $168 billion, to $82 billion.

For all the complaints about outrageous executive pay and how little Paulson is doing to curb it, a big reason why these firms have been scrounging for capital is they keep blowing huge wads of it on their rank-and-file, too. The Paulson plan will do nothing to change that.

In the interim, we continue propping up an industry that's bloated with overcapacity, because we're all too scared to let the market fix it. That's good for the people getting bonus checks at Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs. It's not so great for the rest of us.

Goldman partners’ reduced

By Greg Farrell in New York

Published: October 29 2008 20:37 | Last updated: October 29 2008 20:37

Goldman Sachs unveiled its new class of 94 partners, proving that even in the most tumultuous times on Wall Street, the company’s biannual ritual of bringing up-and-comers to its innermost circle would continue.

The class will join Goldman’s elite at a time when a partnership at the firm is no longer a guarantee of a multi-million payday. By the end of this year, the bank’s 349 partners stand to divvy up the smallest bonus pool that Goldman has produced, on a per capita basis, since going public in 1999.

While Goldman was willing to confirm the announcement of the partners, it would not comment on the other biannual tradition that goes hand-in-hand with the process: the “de-partnering” of a comparable number of its partner-managing directors.

The bank tries to keep the number of partners at about 1 per cent of employees.

At the end of the third quarter, the firm had 349 partners and 32,600 employees worldwide. With plans to lay off some 10 per cent of its workforce, Goldman will probably try to hold its number of partners at its current level, or shrink it slightly.

That means that with the addition of 94 names in December, the new total of 443 partners will have to be reduced, through attrition and the removal of the designation of “partner” from close to 100 members of the inner circle.

Charles Ellis, author of The Partnership, The Making of Goldman Sachs, likens the culling process to a Darwinian exercise. “It’s entirely rational, ruthless and unemotional,” he says. “There’s no softness and no sentiment to it. The firm just gets the best people and empowers them. Some people react badly to that, but it’s survival of the fittest.”

In many ways, Ellis says, Goldman’s focus on recruiting the best people, promoting them and pushing them ever harder, is what separates it from its rivals. “At most places, once you become a partner, you have tenure,” he says. “You’re a superstar. At Goldman Sachs, that’s not it. You’re expected to accelerate.”

For the first three quarters of 2008, Goldman has reported profits of $4.4bn, down by almost half from last year’s sum. According to SEC filings, it has set aside $11.4bn for pay and benefits, (from the bailout money) a decline of 32 per cent over 2007. Barring a big change in the firm’s performance, the current partners can expect bonuses, on the average, of $1m or less, according to people familiar with the matter.

Goldman Sachs ready to hand out £7bn salary and bonus package... after its £6bn bail-out

By Simon Duke
Last updated at 8:55 AM on 30th October 2008

U.S. investment bank Goldman Sachs HQ which has set aside £7bn for bonuses and salaries this year

Goldman Sachs is on course to pay its top City bankers multimillion-pound bonuses - despite asking the U.S. government for an emergency bail-out.

The struggling Wall Street bank has set aside £7billion for salaries and 2008 year-end bonuses, it emerged yesterday.

Each of the firm's 443 partners is on course to pocket an average Christmas bonus of more than £3million.

The size of the pay pool comfortably dwarfs the £6.1billion lifeline which the U.S. government is throwing to Goldman as part of its £430billion bail-out.

As Washington pours money into the bank, the cash will immediately be channelled to Goldman's already well-heeled employees.

News of the firm's largesse will revive the anger over the 'rewards for failure' culture endemic in the world of high finance.

The same bankers who have brought the global economy to its knees seem to pocketing the same kind of rewards they got during the boom years.

Gordon Brown has vowed to crack down on the culture of greed in the City as part of his £500billion bail-out of the UK banking industry.

But that won't affect the estimated 100 London partners working at Goldman Sachs's London headquarters.

The firm - known as Golden Sacks for the bumper bonuses it pay its top bankers - is expected to cut the payouts by a third this year. However, profits are

falling much faster. Earnings have plunged 47 per cent so far this year amid the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression.

This has wiped more than 50 per cent off the company's market value.

The news comes after it was revealed that even bankers working for collapsed Wall Street giant, Lehman Brothers, could receive huge payouts.

Its 10,000 U.S. staff are expected to share a £1.5billion bonus pool. The payouts were agreed as part of the rescue takeover of Lehman's American arm by Barclays last month.

The blockbuster handouts caused consternation among London employees of the firm, many of whom have now lost their jobs.

Even workers at the nationalised Northern Rock will scoop bonuses worth up to £50million over the next three years.

The extraordinary handouts include more than £400,000 for Rock's boss, Gary Hoffman, who is likely to become Britain's best-paid public sector worker.

The majority of Northern Rock's 4,000 workers will receive four separate bonus payments - the first of

which will be made next March. Staff will get an extra 10 per cent on top of their basic salary.

Lloyds TSB also intends to pay its employees bonuses despite taking a £5.5 billion emergency cash injection from the taxpayer.

News of Goldman's bonus plan came as the firm promoted 92 of its bankers to partner level. A quarter are based in Fleet Street, London.

Partnership is the holy grail of the investment banking world as the exclusive club shares around a fifth of the firm's total bonus pool.

New York Attorney General Andrew Cuomo last night warned that Wall Street firms taking government-money risk breaking the law if they hand the cash straight back to employees.

Cash-strapped workers are being penalised by pay rises which are far below the soaring cost of living, research reveals today.

Despite inflation soaring to a 16-year-high of 5.2 per cent, the average worker got a pay rise of just 3.8 per cent in September.

The research, from the pay specialists Incomes Data Services, highlights the financial problems facing millions of workers.

Most of their household bills, particularly food and fuel, are rocketing by up to 35 per cent. However, their meagre pay rise does not begin to cover the extra cost.

The majority of the 50 pay settlements investigated by IDS were in the private sector covering around 1.1million employees.

They range from just 2 per cent for workers at the BBC to 5.3 per cent for workers at a firm of dockyard workers.

Incomes Data Services warned pay rises are likely to fall even further over the coming year as inflation is expected to drop sharply.

Economists predict inflation will fall below the Government's 2 per cent target next year.

Monday, November 03, 2008

Effectiveness of AIG's $143 Billion Rescue Questioned

By Carol D. Leonnig

Washington Post Staff Writer
Monday, November 3, 2008; A18

A number of financial experts now fear that the federal government's $143 billion attempt to rescue troubled insurance giant American International Group may not work, and some argue that company shareholders and taxpayers would have been better served by a bankruptcy filing.

The Treasury Department leapt to keep AIG from going bankrupt on Sept. 16, and in the past seven weeks, AIG has drawn down $90 billion in federal bailout loans. But some key AIG players argue that bankruptcy would have offered more structure and greater protections during a time of intense market volatility.

AIG declined to comment on the matter.

Echoing some other experts, Ann Rutledge, a credit derivatives expert and founding principal of R&R Consulting, said she is not sure how badly the financial system would have been rocked if the government had let AIG file for bankruptcy protection. But she fears that the government is papering over the problem with a quick fix that was not well planned.

"What we see now are a lot of games by the government to keep these institutions going with a lot of cash," she said. "This is to fill holes in companies' balance sheets, and they're trying to hold at bay the charges that our financial system is insolvent."

The deal that the Treasury and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York pressed upon AIG was intended to stop any domino effect of financial institutions falling because of their business ties to AIG. The rescue allowed AIG to provide cash to huge banks and other players who had invested in rapidly souring mortgages insured by the company.

Early this year, investors had begun privately demanding that AIG pay off its billion-dollar guarantees. But in mid-September, when the demands for cash reached a public crescendo, AIG had to admit that it didn't have enough cash on hand to meet the obligations.

In the first weeks of its federal rescue, AIG has used the loan money to post collateral demanded by these firms, sources close to those deals say.

"No one else benefits," former AIG chief executive and major shareholder Maurice R. "Hank" Greenberg wrote to AIG's current chief executive on Thursday. "Unless there is immediate change to the structure of the Federal loan, the American taxpayer will likely suffer a significant financial loss."

Another concern is that in this depressed market, AIG, and the taxpayers that now own 80 percent of the company, will lose coming and going.

The company may be forced to borrow additional federal funds for rising payouts to counterparties. Neither the government nor AIG is releasing information about the specific amounts paid to individual firms, but numerous credit experts say that the value of those mortgage assets is probably declining every week. That means AIG has to pay a higher price as part of its guarantees.

The company also may be forced to sell many more assets at low, fire-sale prices. As part of its loan deal, AIG was to sell some assets -- valued at $1 trillion before the crisis -- to raise cash to pay off the loan.

AIG's Financial Products division is the primary villain in the company's free-fall. It made tens of billions of disastrously bad bets on mortgage investments but may not have carefully hedged those bets or properly estimated its risk. The company's rapid burn of $90 billion also suggests that it grossly undervalued its obligations to counterparties in a worst-case scenario.

In February, internal notes show, board members discussed a growing dispute between AIG Financial Products and Goldman Sachs about the value of those assets when Goldman called for AIG to post collateral. AIG's chief financial officer warned of "Goldman's acknowledged desire to obtain as much cash as possible." But AIG's external accountants warned that it was they who alerted management to the dispute, not AIG Financial Products, and that the division was not properly considering the market in its pricing.

Rutledge warns that because there has been no public disclosure of AIG's payments to counterparties, it is impossible to know whether the pricing it is using now is proper.

The Federal Reserve and its advisers have acknowledged privately that things are not going according to plan.

As AIG has rapidly eaten through the loan money, the Fed has twice expanded its original $85 billion bailout -- which itself was the largest government bailout of a private company in U.S. history. Earlier last month, the Fed reluctantly gave AIG $38 billion more in credit for securities lending to try to keep the firm from drawing down its first Fed loan too quickly.

Then on Thursday, the Fed agreed to let AIG borrow $20 billion from a larger commercial paper bailout fund it had set up days earlier for all institutions that lend money to each other.

If the company had filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection, AIG could have frozen the crippling collateral calls, and shareholders would have had a chance at recovering some value from the company's 80 percent drop in stock price from earlier this year, said Lee Wolosky, a lawyer for AIG's largest shareholder, Starr International.

"AIG is nothing more than a pass-through being charged 14 percent interest," Wolosky said. "Company assets are eroding on a daily basis; asset sales have not begun and can only be at fire-sale prices in the current market. "

But David Schiff of Schiff's Insurance Observer said he could not see how bankruptcy would have been a better solution.

"The point isn't to save AIG; it's to save the U.S. financial system. I think they were afraid to find out who else goes under if you let AIG fail," he said. "But right now, no one knows if this is going to work."

The Bush gang's parting gift: a final, frantic looting of public wealth

The US bail-out amounts to a strings-free, public-funded windfall for big business. Welcome to no-risk capitalism

In the final days of the election many Republicans seem to have given up the fight for power. But don't be fooled: that doesn't mean they are relaxing. If you want to see real Republican elbow grease, check out the energy going into chucking great chunks of the $700bn bail-out out the door. At a recent Senate banking committee hearing, the Republican Bob Corker was fixated on this task, and with a clear deadline in mind: inauguration. "How much of it do you think may be actually spent by January 20 or so?" Corker asked Neel Kashkari, the 35-year-old former banker in charge of the bail-out.

When European colonialists realised that they had no choice but to hand over power to the indigenous citizens, they would often turn their attention to stripping the local treasury of its gold and grabbing valuable livestock. If they were really nasty, like the Portuguese in Mozambique in the mid-1970s, they poured concrete down the elevator shafts.

Nothing so barbaric for the Bush gang. Rather than open plunder, it prefers bureaucratic instruments, such as "distressed asset" auctions and the "equity purchase program". But make no mistake: the goal is the same as it was for the defeated Portuguese - a final, frantic looting of the public wealth before they hand over the keys to the safe.

How else to make sense of the bizarre decisions that have governed the allocation of the bail-out money? When the Bush administration announced it would be injecting $250bn into US banks in exchange for equity, the plan was widely referred to as "partial nationalisation" - a radical measure required to get banks lending again. Henry Paulson, the treasury secretary, had seen the light, we were told, and was following the lead of Gordon Brown.

In fact, there has been no nationalisation, partial or otherwise. American taxpayers have gained no meaningful control over the banks, which is why the banks are free to spend the new money as they wish. At Morgan Stanley, it looks as if much of the windfall will cover this year's bonuses. Citigroup has been hinting it will use its $25bn buying other banks, while John Thain, the chief executive of Merrill Lynch, told analysts: "At least for the next quarter, it's just going to be a cushion." The US government, meanwhile, is reduced to pleading with the banks that they at least spend a portion of the taxpayer windfall for loans - officially, the reason for the entire programme.

What, then, is the real purpose of the bail-out? My fear is this rush of dealmaking is something much more ambitious than a one-off gift to big business: that the Bush version of "partial nationalisation" is rigged to turn the US treasury into a bottomless cash machine for the banks for years to come. Remember, the main concern among the big market players, particularly banks, is not the lack of credit but their battered share prices. Investors have lost confidence in the honesty of the big financial players, and with good reason.

This is where the treasury's equity pays off big time. By purchasing stakes in these financial institutions, the treasury is sending a signal to the market that they are a safe bet. Why safe? Not because their level of risk has been accurately assessed at last. Not because they have renounced the kind of exotic instruments and outrageous leverage rates that created the crisis. But because the market will now be banking on the fact that the US government won't let these particular companies fail. If they get themselves into trouble, investors will now assume that the government will keep finding more cash to bail them out, since allowing them to go down would mean losing the initial equity investments, many of them in the billions. (Just look at the insurance giant AIG, which has already gone back to taxpayers for a top-up, and seems likely to ask for a third.)

This tethering of the public interest to private companies is the real purpose of the bail-out plan: Paulson is handing all the companies admitted to the programme - a number potentially in the thousands - an implicit treasury department guarantee. To skittish investors looking for safe places to park their money, these equity deals will be even more comforting than a triple-A from Moody's rating agency.

Insurance like that is priceless. But for the banks, the best part is that the government is paying them to accept its seal of approval. For taxpayers, on the other hand, this entire plan is extremely risky, and may well cost significantly more than Paulson's original idea of buying up $700bn in toxic debts. Now taxpayers aren't just on the hook for the debts but, arguably, for the fate of every corporation that sells them equity.

Interestingly, mortgage fund giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac both enjoyed this kind of unspoken guarantee before they were nationalised at the start of this crisis. For decades the market understood that, since these private players were enmeshed with the government, Uncle Sam could be counted on to always save the day. It was, as many have pointed out, the worst of all worlds. Not only were profits privatised while risks were socialised, but the implicit government backing created powerful incentives for reckless business practices.

With the new equity purchase programme Paulson has taken the discredited Fannie and Freddie model and applied it to a huge swath of the private banking industry. Again, there is no reason to shy away from risky bets, especially since the treasury has made no such demands of the banks (apparently it doesn't want to "micromanage".)

To further boost market confidence, the federal government has also unveiled unlimited public guarantees for many bank deposit accounts. Oh, and as if this were not enough, the treasury has been encouraging the banks to merge, ensuring that the only institutions left will be "too big to fail", thereby guaranteed a bail-out. In three ways, the market is being told loud and clear that Washington will not allow the financial institutions to bear the consequences of their behaviour. This may be Bush's most creative innovation: no-risk capitalism.

There is a glimmer of hope. In answer to Senator Corker's question, the treasury is indeed having trouble dispersing the bail-out funds. So far it has requested about $350bn of the $700bn, but most of this hasn't yet made it out the door. Meanwhile, every day it becomes clearer that the bail-out was sold to the public on false pretences. Clearly, it was never really about getting loans flowing. It was always about doing what it is doing: turning the state into a giant insurance agency for Wall Street, a safety net for the people who need it least, subsidised by the people who will most need state protections in the economic storms ahead.

This duplicity is a political opportunity. Whoever wins on November 4 will have enormous moral authority. It should be used to call for a freeze on the dispersal of bail-out funds, not after the inauguration but right away. All deals should be renegotiated, this time with the public getting the guarantees.

It is risky, of course, to interrupt the bail-out process. Nothing could be riskier, however, than allowing the Bush gang their parting gift to big business - the gift that will keep on taking.

Wednesday, October 29, 2008

Who Runs the show?

War, as the liberal intellectual Randolph Bourne famously explained, is the health of the state. That is, it benefits state officials and their dependents, clients, and assorted sycophants at the expense of the rest of us. Many are impoverished by our policies, but a few are enriched. The beneficiaries are the growing administrative, corporate, and military bureaucracies that oversee our ever expanding global presence, in effect a colonial class. This class pursues and secures its economic and social interests by means of directly influencing government policy, operating as an organized force on behalf of the policy of imperialism, so far with remarkable success.

When John McCain sneered at Mitt Romney's business experience as lacking in honor and the spirit of self-sacrifice, he was expressing the "noble" and highly stagy sentiments of this rising class. Forget the free market fervor of the Reagan era, when entrepreneurs were valorized. The new Republican hero is the swaggering caesar.

Is the Iraq war good for the economy?

Well, whose economy? Who benefits from this war, and who loses? Once the American people realize that they're among this war's biggest losers – aside from the Iraqi people, and perhaps the Iranians, too – they'll turn on the beneficiaries with a vengeance. As their savings are eaten up by inflation, and the equity they labored to preserve and increase evaporates into thin air, ordinary Americans are likely to be quite interested in the question: who's responsible?

As the Federal Reserve pumps more funny money into circulation, in a desperate and vain attempt to postpone the crisis of the Warfare State, the single biggest winners are the banks, the most government-protected industry of all, who are the first to be bailed out of any crisis. Oh, perhaps a few will be allowed to go under, but the big ones will be too big to fall, like Bear Stearns. The economic elite will golden parachute its way out of the crisis.

The main beneficiaries of the present system – what Murray Rothbard, the late libertarian theorist and polemicist, called the Welfare-Warfare State – are the new plutocrats. Think of what Ayn Rand referred to as "the aristocracy of pull," the principal villains of her famous novel Atlas Shrugged, i.e., corrupt businessmen who succeeded on account of their political connections rather than their entrepreneurial skill.

Today's aristocracy of pull is the militarized sector of the economy, which is completely dependent on government contracts. Their political Praetorian Guard is represented in Washington by both parties, and, what's more, their partisans dominate think-tanks of the ostensible Left as well as the Right.

The task of those who oppose the new colonialism, which masquerades as global altruism of one sort or another, is to unmask the real motives and connections of a self-interested colonial class, which, in spite of its claim to the mantle of honor and duty to country, is supremely successful at promoting its own interests over and above those of the nation.

~ Justin Raimondo

Monday, October 27, 2008

Bridge to Prison - Stevens Convicted all counts

WASHINGTON (CNN) -- A jury found U.S. Sen. Ted Stevens of Alaska guilty Monday of all seven counts in his federal corruption trial.

The jury found Stevens guilty of "knowingly and willfully" scheming to conceal on Senate disclosure forms more than $250,000 in home renovations and other gifts from an Alaska-based oil industry contractor.

Stevens faces a maximum sentence of up to to 35 years in prison -- five years for each of the seven counts.

Legal experts note the judge has the discretion to give Stevens as little as no jail time and probation when he is sentenced.

He sat expressionless as the seven verdicts were read out at the end of his trial, less than a day after the jury began deliberations from scratch because of a change in jurors.

After the second guilty verdict was read, Stevens' lead defense attorney, Brendan Sullivan, patted his back, leaving his hand there.

As Stevens left the defense area, he and his wife exchanged a kiss on the cheek. Stevens said: "It's not over yet." Stevens' defense team said they will move for a new trial.

Stevens left the courthouse without comment.

"This is a sad day for Alaska and a sad day for Senator Stevens and his family," Alaska Gov. and vice presidential candidate Sarah Palin said Monday.

"The verdict shines a light on the corrupting influence of the big oil service company up there in Alaska that was allowed to control too much of our state. And that control was part of the culture of corruption that I was elected to fight, and that fight must always move forward regardless of party affiliation or seniority or even past service," she said.

Stevens accepted "hundreds of thousands of dollars of freebies" from a major oil services company in his state, acting assistant Attorney General Matthew Friedrich said after the verdict.

"This company was not a charity," he said, saying it solicited Stevens for help in Washington at the same time it was transforming Stevens' single-story A-frame Alaska house into a two-story structure with a deck, new gas grill and other accouterments.

The 84-year-old senator is locked in a tight race for re-election against his Democratic challenger, Mark Begich. Stevens hopes to retain the seat he has held since 1968.

A poll by Ivan Moore Research conducted October 17-19 found Begich slightly leading the race 46-45, within the poll's margin of error of plus-or-minus 4.4 percentage points.

The longest-serving Republican senator in history, Stevens becomes the first senator to be convicted of a felony since 1981.

Judge Emmet Sullivan has scheduled a hearing on any pending motions for February 25.

The charges against Stevens related to renovations on his family home in Girdwood, Alaska. The remodeling was done by his longtime friend, Bill Allen, and Allen's oil industry services company, VECO Corp.

The prosecution accused Stevens of knowingly failing to declare hundreds of thousands of dollars worth of gifts and work on his house in Alaska between 1999 and 2006. Members of the Senate are required to fill out forms each year stating what gifts they have received and from whom.

Stevens' defense said Allen, the senator's friend, had quashed bills without the senator's knowledge. Allen testified that he had done so because he "liked Ted."

The defense said Stevens had paid the bills he received, thinking they covered the full cost of renovating the house in Girdwood, Alaska.

Allen, the government's star witness, earlier pleaded guilty to trying to bribe a number of Alaska state lawmakers, not including Stevens. He is awaiting sentencing.

The jury began deliberations at noon Wednesday, but started anew Monday morning when an alternate replaced a juror who left town abruptly last week because of the death of her father.

The verdict comes after jurors spotted a discrepancy Monday between the government's indictment and a key piece of evidence. The judge declined to throw out the related charge against Stevens

The indictment accuses Stevens of checking "No" in response to a question about whether Stevens or his family had "any reportable gift ... more than $260" in 2001. But the form introduced as evidence in court shows he checked "Yes."

The jury sent out a note on the issue, prompting a debate between defense and prosecution attorneys about what instructions Sullivan should send the jury.

Prosecutors said the error was simply a "typo" on the indictment, and that other charges and evidence covered Steven's alleged failure to disclose the home renovations at issue in the case.

Stevens' defense said the judge should toss out the count that no longer matched the evidence.

The juror who left last week was Juror No. 4, a paralegal in her 40s. She told a U.S. marshal that she had to leave the state for a family emergency after the jury was dismissed Thursday.

Judge Sullivan dismissed the jury Friday morning after the woman left for California, hoping to resume with her on the panel as soon as possible.

Since then, court officials made several unsuccessful attempts to reach the woman. Defense attorneys for Stevens, who was in court Sunday, had asked the judge to put off deliberations another day as they awaited the return of the juror, arguing against inserting an alternate in the middle of the process.

Last week, the judge dealt with another juror issue after the panel sent him a note Thursday accusing juror No. 9 of "violent outbursts" and other misconduct. They asked that she be dismissed, but Sullivan gave what he called a "pep talk" to the 12 and told them to resume their deliberations.

Saturday, October 18, 2008

Wall Street Monsters & Meat

Jim Willie

The tag team of JPMorgan as the monster and Goldman Sachs as its harlot represent a powerful pair that is more responsible for destroying the entire US financial system than 95% of the American public has any awareness. The colossus of JPMorgan is a monster, a predator, nurtured by pond scum. It has gobbled up Chase Manhattan, Manufacturers Hanover, Chemical Bank, Bank One, and more over the past two decades. Their profound presence in keeping the USTreasury Bond yields down can never be understated. They do so by managing 85% of the credit derivatives on the planet. They distorted usury prices, as in price of borrowed money, thus aggravating the LIBOR (London InterBank Offered Rate) market in a very visible manner. The oblong usury prices have contributed mightily to the destruction of the USEconomy itself, created bubbles, killed jobs, and wrecked savings. The ugliest hidden activity for the JPMorgan monster is to manage the Bank of Baghdad, where they manipulate the crude oil price, where drug trafficking money is funneled from Afghan sales, under management by the USMilitary aegis (guys with no uniform stripes or markings). Maybe such illicit money offsets Credit Default Swap losses, making America strong for freedom and liberty. Goldman Sachs is clearly the investment banking agent for the USGovt, given the privilege of insider trading in unspeakable proportions. They manage the Plunge Protection Team efforts to intervene in financial markets, making America strong for freedom and liberty. The new kid on the block is the FDIC. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corp is steering fresh meat into the corralled JPMorgan stockyards for slaughterhouse feeding. The label of harlot might be too kind, especially from the perspective of senior bond holders. But JPMorgan requires fresh meat (capital) periodically, thus making America strong for freedom and liberty. Nevermind the fires caused after its hearty meals and flatulence.

This article discusses the JPMorgan monster, its behavior, and teeth revealed. Robb Kirby (see his website, click HERE) often covers JPMorgan illicit behavior. This article discusses banking system realignments to destroy savings accounts owned by the people, and the Coup d'Etat just completed. The criminals on Wall Street have taken full control of the USGovt financial management, with blank check written by a thoroughly intimidated USCongress, deceived steadily and easily. Threats and intimidation are central to the successful coup. The Ponzi Scheme has been revealed, even as the frail and tattered Shadow Banking System has been revealed. The key to the bailouts is its continued Top Down approach, which favors the Ruling Elite and denies all but crumbs to the people, who have been subjected to a foreclosure revolving door on mortgage loan assistance. Since nothing has been solved from this approach, a total systemic breakdown is assured, whose climax will be the current Administration and the Wall Street executives in charge of the criminal syndicate riding off into the sunset in retirement. Rome burns. Much more detail is provided in the upcoming October report due this weekend. The theme is this subset synopsis article is of criminality, deception, monster exploitation, market corruption, and the collapse of a failed system, whose crescendo represents the greatest financial crimes ever witnessed in modern history. Americans do it big! The proprietary Hat Trick Letter covers much more of recent events, interpretation, and analysis, but here, focus on impropriety.

THE MONSTER, ITS BROKER & HARLOT

JPMorgan will require fresh asset meat every several weeks in order to survive, but the process will result in a sequence of severely damaging CDSwap fires. Perversely, the FDIC is their investment banker agent. Two mergers of questionable nature highlight the altered role of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp (FDIC), which no longer protects bank depositors or their investors, but rather serves JPMorgan Chase. When Bank of America merged with Merrill Lynch, a trend started, one that exposed private stock brokerage accounts. Officially they can be legally borrowed across subsidiary lines. The FDIC averted a failure of Merrill Lynch without the credit default implications. The other event was more blatant, as the FDIC steered Washington Mutual out of bankruptcy failure and into the JPMorgan slaughterhouse. Inside its chambers, JPM gobbled up the WaMu deposits and benefited from ratio improvements. Senior bond holders were crushed, fully denied due process from bankruptcy. The FDIC has become an ugly investment banker lookalike, serving JPM and not the US public. The FDIC owns a pitifully small $45 billion in funds available for bank bailouts, at June count. When the dust clears a year or more from now, many multiples more will be necessary for many bank failures.

The path of JPMorgan growth into a FRANKENSTEIN took radical changes in course after both the failures of Lehman Brothers and recognition that Fannie Mae & Fannie Mae had to be taken over by the USGovt. To halt the run on their bonds, the USGovt acquired the entire F&F Cesspool. The impact hit the Credit Default Swap market immediately. AIG had been weakened one week earlier from the technical default of Fannie & Freddie, which resulted in broad CDSwap payouts. Ripple effects from the Lehman Brothers failure that followed were deep and broad throughout the system, killing AIG. The Wall Street central harlot (Goldman Sachs) advised the USGovt to assume full control and risk of AIG, as GSachs avoided $20 billion in sudden losses in the nick of time, a pure coincidence!

The entire episode with Wells Fargo bidding for Wachovia, in competition from Citigroup, is steeped in comedy with vampire stars. The grapevine in Washington and Wall Street passes word that the Citigroup versus Wachovia wrestling match was actually a sponsored backdoor bailout attempt to save Citigroup, not just Wachovia. Again, the FDIC was the matchmaker. My term has been 'Dead Marrying the Dead' which still holds true, since Citigroup has been dead for one year. Under the original Citigroup proposal, the FDIC had arranged for guarantees of $42 billion for Wachovia debt by the USFed. The new Wells Fargo deal enabled the US taxpayers to get off the hook. The reversal by the FDIC to serve the public has caused gigantic Wall Street problems, as Citigroup now finds itself in a position more perilous than anyone believed. This battle has flip-flopped once, and might again. Citigroup would probably have died if not for the USGovt purchase of bank stocks.

THE TEETH OF THE MONSTER REVEALED

JPMorgan is a monster predator at work, hidden from view. After the Fannie Mae experience, covering their giant raft of CDSwap contracts, making huge payouts, JPMorgan was close to a bankruptcy. They needed to feed off another bank, to consume private deposits and thus shore up the balance sheet. Lehman Brothers was let go to fail, but its failure would surely trigger a gigantic wave of credit market fires. The Lehman CDSwap resolution has cost roughly $300 billion, paying 91 cents per dollar of coverage on their failed bonds. The Wall Street Powerz permitted Lehman to fail, so as to prevent a JPMorgan failure, thus risking that the fires caused could be contained in CDSwap fallout. The irony is that JPMorgan undoubtedly suffered considerably from that fire in fallout. Now JPMorgan might need another Wall Street failure, for to consume another block of assets, but with yet another ensuing CDSwap fire. JPMorgan is a monster predator at work, soon hungry again. It might be eyeing Morgan Stanley. We might discover a failure in an unexpected place, like a big insurance firm, whose sector condition is not well advertised.

With each big bank failure, whether a commercial bank or investment bank, heavy damage is done to the system. The CDSwap destruction is mostly hidden, with large pillars burned out. We the people hear of the destruction only if and when a major bank fails as a result. No death, no news, however but with potentially significant hidden structural damage. As financial firms pay out vast sums on CDSwaps as in the Lehman case, and the Fannie Mae case, and the Freddie Mac case, the system bleeds capital. Lending suffers. The sequence corresponds to a powerful vicious cycle. JPMorgan will need more deaths to survive, but each death causes more deadly CDSwap fires. JPMorgan is a monster predator at work, which leaves fires on pathways where it last stepped. The best analogy is that CDSwap contract payouts from bond failures are like mini-Hiroshima events that might lead to a bigger such event. Ironically, to save JPM the financial system must destroy the shadow banking system centered in New York City, since Wall Street firms, plus Bank of America are at its center. The system lacks disclosure and transparency, just like Wall Street likes it.

Permit the pathogenesis to proceed further, and the majority of Western bank system must be burned in order to leave JPMorgan as prominent survivor to rule over a scorched empire. This process is a sick consolidation. The bank conglomerate is a major crime syndicate colossus, and center of the drug traffic money laundering, coordinated by security agencies, fully condoned by the US Federal Reserve itself. The AIG story is nowhere complete, the latest being their expensive parties. AIG has caused major complications, another monster that will resurface periodically at feeding time. Personally, my wish is to see the RICO law brought forward, at least to deposit the monster in a cage. In done my way, not a single additional USCongressional bill would be approved and granted for a bailout or rescue without rapid investigation, prosecution, turn to state's evidence, asset seizure, restitution, and imprisonment for dozens of Wall Street executives, starting with Hank Paulson.

STOCK MANIPULATION WITH DEEP MOTIVE

Few analysts, pundits, or anchors are aware of the mammoth conflict of interest involved with the USTreasury Bond sales required to pay for all the bailouts. JPMorgan, with the essential aid of Goldman Sachs, plot to bring down the DJIA index and the S&P500 index whenever the USTreasury conducts auctions or needs Congressional passage of key bailout bills. They have sold $194 billion of Cash Mgmt Bills (CMB) in the last two weeks, today $70B, tomorrow another $60B. The big stock declines seen recently work to the BENEFIT of the USTreasury and USFed as agent for auctions. TBill yields are down near zero, in case you have not noticed, with principal prices corresponding almost as high as the bond permits. The USGovt is conducting auctions for TBills at top dollar prices, when its credit rating should be caving in radically upon downgrades. These USTreasurys are destined to enter default at a later date, where the loss to foreign investors will be maximized. Most of the US public has savings dominated by stocks, with little in bonds. So the US public is being fleeced, coming and going, since even money markets contain toxic mortgage bonds. Look for the stock market decline to come to a surprising end when the USGovt has completed the majority of their planned emergency supply sales via auction.

The Wall Street tactics have recently turned more vicious and devious, actually creating volatility, producing fear for political purpose. They accuse hedge funds of driving up the crude oil price, rendering great harm to the USEconomy and US citizens. So they urged unsuccessfully the Securities & Exchange Commission to force hedge funds to reveal their speculative positions. The Wall Street thieves and conmen wish to learn details on hedge fund positions so as to target them illicitly. In a queer twist, JPMorgan has benefited from an interesting double kill. They exploit hedge funds, wreck them, then encourage them into the fold at JPM in brokerage accounts, where their private accounts are rendered vulnerable under the new USFed rules. JPMorgan is a monster predator at work, which is permitted to manipulate markets and clients with total impunity.

There is one more detail. Lest one forget, Goldman Sachs was exempt from the short rule restriction placed on a few hundred financial stocks traded. The reason had something to do with market stability and integrity assurance! Goldman Sachs clearly profited from the ups & down in the Dow and S&P500, lifting stocks after Congressional agreements, pulling them down before those agreements. JPMorgan and Goldman Sachs profit handsomely when the USGovt Plunge Protection Team pushes the stock indexes up with their usual methods. Of course JPM and GSachs are the managers of the PPT efforts. YES, IT IS TIME TO PUKE NOW!!!

HIDDEN USGOVT COUP BY WALL STREET

The USCongress has been subverted by intimidation and ignorance, maybe bribery. Regulators and law enforcement bodies are mere accomplices. The entire US banking system has undergone an unprecedented grand nationalize initiative, including the financial system, when considering the mortgage and insurance giants. The total bailouts are huge when put into perspective. This is a hidden coup, complete with deep fraud, corruption, and ruin for both prosecutors and whistle blowers. The USDollar is caught in the middle of a black hole scrambled with fraud. Paulson is the new Chancellor of US Inc, Bernanke the new Currency Lithography Manager, and Sheila Bair the Investment Banker (a la Goldman Suchs). Paulson assumes all powers over the financial state from the president, via the banking industry control. The government bailout redemption of $trillion past fraud closes the loop. Bernanke manages all efforts to use printed money for the purpose of buying worthless counterfeited and fraud-laced bonds, buying commercial bonds and posted collateral among businesses, as well as making printed paper products available to foreign central banks in relief of past fraud. Bair will act as the director of slaughterhouse traffic for JPMorgan, which needs a steady supply of bank deposits to offset their destroyed balance sheet from continued credit derivative implosion, thereby betraying the chartered FDIC pledge to protect bank depositors and senior bank bond holders through liquidation procedures, with full recognition of expedience. Hail to the king, long live the king! The US public seems so dumbstruck that it cannot demand even full disclosure of the process, let alone private offshore bank accounts for the new leaders of the successful coup.

The coup formalizes a climax to a Ponzi Scheme. A pyramid scheme is a non-sustainable business model that involves the exchange of money primarily for enrolling other people into the scheme, without any product or service bearing true value delivered. With the ongoing steadfast support offered by Alan Greenspan, they were able to maintain an incredible Ponzi scheme. They sold financial toxic waste products in the form of Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS), Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDO), Structured Investment Vehicles (SIV), Unidentified Financial Objects (UFO), and Credit Default Swaps (CDS). My favorite remains the UFOs. The corruption of politicians in Congress enabled the process, with relaxed guidance by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB). The two key ingredients for the Ponzi Scheme are a mythological ideology and a high priest to endorse the game from a credible pulpit. Alan Greenspan claimed legitimacy of the US banking system, blessed credit growth and fractional bank practices as beneficial, and praised risk pricing systems using credit derivatives as sophisticated. The high priest used to be Greenspan, but now a tag team has replaced him. Hank Paulson is the spearhead for the great coup of the US financial system. Usage of short restrictions rules has been key to both instilling instability at necessary times, and raiding hedge funds. USFed Chairman Bernanke swaps USTBonds for any piece of bonded garbage known to mankind. Mammoth placements of leveraged trades by Wall Street firms make for some of the most grotesque insider trading in US history.

DECEIT & INTIMIDATION

The lies, deceit, backroom pressure, and fleecing of the American public is deep. Take the Emergency Economic Stability Act. Most of the initial $250 billion outlay was not devoted to American bankers, but rather to foreign bankers, primarily in Europe and England, and to purchase preferred US bank stocks. The US public was not told about this redirection, which constitutes misallocation, misappropriation, and fraud. Tremendous backroom pressure was exerted at every step. The underlying assets involved in swaps do not even have to be US-based mortgage bonds. The formerly submitted Paulson Manifesto was revived in a power grab, complete with considerable infighting and squabbles, since Morgan Stanley was given favor. The usage of funds to buy investment stakes in the giant US banks is yet another direct Fascist Business Model tactic, assisting banks close to the power center, yet reeking with corruption. The sickening irony is that they have no more money to disseminate and distribute. They cannot reveal their lies until they formally request more Congressional funds. Much discussion has come that the USGovt should adopt the Swedish model in the resolution of the current crisis. Not in a New York minute!! That would require heavy stock and bond losses, and more transparency of scum. Interestingly, the market discounts words as worthless, while bailout actions fail to produce even a positive reaction for a full day, until Monday last week when the Dow Jones Industrial index rose over 900 points. That was clearly Wall Street engineering a profitable short cover rally. Check S&P futures positions beforehand, if you can. The credibility of the USFed is close to being destroyed. On October 15, the same Dow Jones index fell over 700 points, almost 8%. Even the global rate cut was rejected by stock markets, a major insult.

Intimidation of the USCongress has been huge and powerful, similar to when the Patriot Act was passed in 2002. The Congress was actually threatened by martial law in the cities of the United States if the big bailout package was not passed two weeks ago! This was not reported on CNN or CNBC, but C-Span did cover it. The mobilization of the USArmy for civilian control is well known in the past couple weeks. See the Third Brigade back from combat duty in Iraq. This account came from Rep Brad Sherman of California. To achieve supposed financial stability, the nation succumbed to totalitarianism by Wall Street thieves, conmen, fraud kings, and criminals. Instead, the bailout only covered up $trillion fraud. My position has been very stable and consistent, that such tactics are typical characteristics of the Fascist Business Model. The state merges with the large corporations, who proceed to terrorize the citizenry after unspeakable protected corruption and theft. To object is to be labeled unpatriotic!

TOP DOWN SOLUTION FAVORS THE ELITE

The top-down approach used to date aids the wealthy bankers, while the homeowners are denied aid. That aid is promised but rarely arrives. The fundamental problem here is that billion$ are devoted to shore up insolvent banks, to redeem their worthless (or nearly worthless) bonds, and to give a giant pass to the executives. Trust has eroded throughout the system. Banks distrust each other's collateral. The result is that eventually the USEconomy will enter not a recession, not a depression, but a DISINTEGRATION PHASE. Despite Bernanke's studious efforts, borrowing from revisionist history, his liquidity is nothing more than bailouts at the top for the perpetrators of the housing bubble and mortgage debacle. The bank system benefits little inside the US walls of finance. A bottom-up approach might have had a chance to succeed, but a top-down approach is a sham. To expect a top-down solution that actually relieves the housing inventory logjam is insane. That is like feeding a teenager with meals placed inside the human rectum, expecting nutrients to find their way to the rest of the body! The credit mechanisms do not travel upward within the pyramid, but rather in the downward direction, starting with a borrower, a good collateralized risk, and an underwritten loan, when plenty of lending capital is available. The US public has bought this stupid 'Trickle Down' philosophy for years, learning nothing. The USEconomy is on the verge of collapsing. Short-term credit is being denied at key supplier intermediary steps, soon to result in recognized disintegration.

The primary practical objective of this corrupt trio (JPM, GSax, FDIC) is to avoid Credit Default Swap fires, which would bring an end to their reign of terror. This USEconomic failure is in progress and is unstoppable. The 1930 Depression resulted after monumental credit abuse from the bottom up, as hundreds of thousands of people leveraged investments 10:1 with stocks primarily. The 2000 Depression will come after monumental credit abuse from the top down, as hundreds of big financial firms leveraged investments by 7:1 and 20:1 with bonds primarily. The most absurd of all is the CDO-squared, leveraging upon leverage. Total seizures have crippled the banking system. Short-term credit has largely vanished, as letters of credit are routinely not honored at ports in the United States. The panic will continue, especially when supplies dry up.

GOLD & SILVER AWAIT THEIR EXALTED STATUS

We are witnessing the disintegration cited in my recent forecasts. It is a systemic failure, marred by lost confidence and trust in the entire financial system. Expect foreigners soon to pull the rug from under the American syndicates in control. Several key meetings have already concluded, totally unreported in the US press, which occurred in Berlin Germany. Consider it the Anti-G7 Meeting. Implications are profound, and involved the Shanghai Coop Org tangentially, since its member nations possess so much new commodity supply. Consider it the Anti-NATO group. An important and powerful alternative financial system is soon to spring into action, including high-level bilateral barter. Those who expect the current US Regime to continue their financial terror are in for a big surprise.

Expect defaults in the COMEX with gold & silver, whose prices for paper vastly diverge from physical, to the anger of foreigners watching. They hold massive precious metals assets. Disparities now contribute to powerful forces, sure to break the current system. Grand systemic changes come. THE RESULT WILL BE A BREATH-TAKING DISCONTINUITY EVENT.

Ironically, the more inner anguish felt on the falling gold & silver prices, the closer we are to a new financial framework, with the USDollar relegated to a Third World role. A REPLACEMENT GLOBAL RESERVE CURRENCY HAS ALREADY BEEN DECIDED UPON. Its launch awaits the proper moment. The Americans are last to know, as usual. The US leaders are under the illusion of being in control!

Tuesday, October 14, 2008

A £516 trillion derivatives 'time-bomb'

Not for nothing did US billionaire Warren Buffett call them the real 'weapons of mass destruction'

By Margareta Pagano and Simon Evans
Sunday, 12 October 2008


The market is worth more than $516 trillion, (£303 trillion), roughly 10 times the value of the entire world's output: it's been called the "ticking time-bomb".

It's a market in which the lead protagonists – typically aggressive, highly educated, and now wealthy young men – have flourished in the derivatives boom. But it's a market that is set to come to a crashing halt – the Great Unwind has begun.

Last week the beginning of the end started for many hedge funds with the combination of diving market values and worried investors pulling out their cash for safer climes.

Some of the world's biggest hedge funds – SAC Capital, Lone Pine and Tiger Global – all revealed they were sitting on double-digit losses this year. September's falls wiped out any profits made in the rest of the year. Polygon, once a darling of the London hedge fund circuit, last week said it was capping the basic salaries of its managers to £100,000 each. Not bad for the average punter but some way off the tens of millions plundered by these hotshots during the good times. But few will be shedding any tears.

The complex and opaque derivatives markets in which these hedge funds played has been dubbed the world's biggest black hole because they operate outside of the grasp of governments, tax inspectors and regulators. They operate in a parallel, shadow world to the rest of the banking system. They are private contracts between two companies or institutions which can't be controlled or properly assessed. In themselves derivative contracts are not dangerous, but if one of them should go wrong – the bad 2 per cent as it's been called – then it is the domino effect which could be so enormous and scary.

Most markets have something behind them. Central banks require reserves – something that backs up the transaction. But derivatives don't have anything – because they are not real money, but paper money. It is also impossible to establish their worth – the $516 trillion number is actually only a notional one. In the mid-Nineties, Nick Leeson lost Barings £1.3bn trading in derivatives, and the bank went bust. In 1998 hedge fund LTCM's $5bn loss nearly brought down the entire system. In fragile times like this, another LTCM could have catastrophic results.

That is why everyone is now so frightened, even the traders, who are desperately trying to unwind their positions but finding it impossible because trading is so volatile and it's difficult to find counterparties. Nor have the hedge funds been in the slightest bit interested in succumbing to normal rules: of the world's thousands of hedge funds only 24 have volunteered to sign up to a code of conduct.

Few understand how this world operates. The US Federal Reserve chairman, Ben Bernanke, tapped up some of Wall Street's best for a primer on their workings when he took the job a few years ago. Britain's financial regulator, the Financial Services Authority, has long talked about the problems the markets could face on the back of derivative complexity. Unfortunately it did little to curb the products' growth.

In America the naysayers have been rather more vocal for longer. Famously, Warren Buffett, the billionaire who made his money the old-fashioned way, called them "weapons of mass destruction". In the late 1990s when confidence was roaring in the midst of the dotcom boom, a small band of politicians, uncomfortable with the ease with which banks would be allowed to play in these burgeoning markets, were painted as Luddites failing to move with the times.

Little-known Democratic senator Byron Dorgan from North Dakota was one of the most vociferous refuseniks, telling his supposedly more savvy New York peers of the dangers. "If you want to gamble, go to Las Vegas. If you want to trade in derivatives, God bless you," he said. He was ignored.

What is a Derivative?

Warren Buffett, the American investment guru, dubbed them "financial weapons of mass destruction", but for the once-great-and-good of Wall Street they were the currency that enabled banks, hedge funds and other speculators to make billions.

Anything that carries a price can spawn a derivatives market. They are financial contracts sold to pass on risk to others. The credit or bond derivatives market is one such example. It is thought that speculation in this area alone is worth more than $56 trillion (£33 trillion), although that probably underestimates the true figure since lax regulation has seen the market explode over the past two years.

At the core of this market is the credit derivative swap, effectively an insurance policy against the default in the interest payment on a corporate bond. One doesn't even need to own the bond itself. It is like Joe Public buying an insurance policy on someone else's house and pocketing the full value if it burns down.

As markets slid into crisis, and banks and corporations began to default on bond payments, many of these policies have proved worthless.

Emilio Botin, the chairman of Santander, the Spanish bank that has enjoyed phenomenal success during the credit crunch, once said: "I never invest in something I don't understand." A wise man, you may think.

Simon Evans

Monday, October 13, 2008

Taking Hard New Look at a Greenspan Legacy

The New York Times
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October 9, 2008
The Reckoning

“Not only have individual financial institutions become less vulnerable to shocks from underlying risk factors, but also the financial system as a whole has become more resilient.” — Alan Greenspan in 2004

George Soros, the prominent financier, avoids using the financial contracts known as derivatives “because we don’t really understand how they work.” Felix G. Rohatyn, the investment banker who saved New York from financial catastrophe in the 1970s, described derivatives as potential “hydrogen bombs.”

And Warren E. Buffett presciently observed five years ago that derivatives were “financial weapons of mass destruction, carrying dangers that, while now latent, are potentially lethal.”

One prominent financial figure, however, has long thought otherwise. And his views held the greatest sway in debates about the regulation and use of derivatives — exotic contracts that promised to protect investors from losses, thereby stimulating riskier practices that led to the financial crisis. For more than a decade, the former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan has fiercely objected whenever derivatives have come under scrutiny in Congress or on Wall Street. “What we have found over the years in the marketplace is that derivatives have been an extraordinarily useful vehicle to transfer risk from those who shouldn’t be taking it to those who are willing to and are capable of doing so,” Mr. Greenspan told the Senate Banking Committee in 2003. “We think it would be a mistake” to more deeply regulate the contracts, he added.

Today, with the world caught in an economic tempest that Mr. Greenspan recently described as “the type of wrenching financial crisis that comes along only once in a century,” his faith in derivatives remains unshaken.

The problem is not that the contracts failed, he says. Rather, the people using them got greedy. A lack of integrity spawned the crisis, he argued in a speech a week ago at Georgetown University, intimating that those peddling derivatives were not as reliable as “the pharmacist who fills the prescription ordered by our physician.”

But others hold a starkly different view of how global markets unwound, and the role that Mr. Greenspan played in setting up this unrest.

“Clearly, derivatives are a centerpiece of the crisis, and he was the leading proponent of the deregulation of derivatives,” said Frank Partnoy, a law professor at the University of San Diego and an expert on financial regulation.

The derivatives market is $531 trillion, up from $106 trillion in 2002 and a relative pittance just two decades ago. Theoretically intended to limit risk and ward off financial problems, the contracts instead have stoked uncertainty and actually spread risk amid doubts about how companies value them.

If Mr. Greenspan had acted differently during his tenure as Federal Reserve chairman from 1987 to 2006, many economists say, the current crisis might have been averted or muted.

Over the years, Mr. Greenspan helped enable an ambitious American experiment in letting market forces run free. Now, the nation is confronting the consequences.

Derivatives were created to soften — or in the argot of Wall Street, “hedge” — investment losses. For example, some of the contracts protect debt holders against losses on mortgage securities. (Their name comes from the fact that their value “derives” from underlying assets like stocks, bonds and commodities.) Many individuals own a common derivative: the insurance contract on their homes.

On a grander scale, such contracts allow financial services firms and corporations to take more complex risks that they might otherwise avoid — for example, issuing more mortgages or corporate debt. And the contracts can be traded, further limiting risk but also increasing the number of parties exposed if problems occur.

Throughout the 1990s, some argued that derivatives had become so vast, intertwined and inscrutable that they required federal oversight to protect the financial system. In meetings with federal officials, celebrated appearances on Capitol Hill and heavily attended speeches, Mr. Greenspan banked on the good will of Wall Street to self-regulate as he fended off restrictions.

Ever since housing began to collapse, Mr. Greenspan’s record has been up for revision. Economists from across the ideological spectrum have criticized his decision to let the nation’s real estate market continue to boom with cheap credit, courtesy of low interest rates, rather than snuffing out price increases with higher rates. Others have criticized Mr. Greenspan for not disciplining institutions that lent indiscriminately.

But whatever history ends up saying about those decisions, Mr. Greenspan’s legacy may ultimately rest on a more deeply embedded and much less scrutinized phenomenon: the spectacular boom and calamitous bust in derivatives trading.

Faith in the System

Some analysts say it is unfair to blame Mr. Greenspan because the crisis is so sprawling. “The notion that Greenspan could have generated a totally different outcome is naïve,” said Robert E. Hall, an economist at the conservative Hoover Institution, a research group at Stanford.

Mr. Greenspan declined requests for an interview. His spokeswoman referred questions about his record to his memoir, “The Age of Turbulence,” in which he outlines his beliefs.

“It seems superfluous to constrain trading in some of the newer derivatives and other innovative financial contracts of the past decade,” Mr. Greenspan writes. “The worst have failed; investors no longer fund them and are not likely to in the future.”

In his Georgetown speech, he entertained no talk of regulation, describing the financial turmoil as the failure of Wall Street to behave honorably.

“In a market system based on trust, reputation has a significant economic value,” Mr. Greenspan told the audience. “I am therefore distressed at how far we have let concerns for reputation slip in recent years.”

As the long-serving chairman of the Fed, the nation’s most powerful economic policy maker, Mr. Greenspan preached the transcendent, wealth-creating powers of the market.

A professed libertarian, he counted among his formative influences the novelist Ayn Rand, who portrayed collective power as an evil force set against the enlightened self-interest of individuals. In turn, he showed a resolute faith that those participating in financial markets would act responsibly.

An examination of more than two decades of Mr. Greenspan’s record on financial regulation and derivatives in particular reveals the degree to which he tethered the health of the nation’s economy to that faith.

As the nascent derivatives market took hold in the early 1990s, and in subsequent years, critics denounced an absence of rules forcing institutions to disclose their positions and set aside funds as a reserve against bad bets.

Time and again, Mr. Greenspan — a revered figure affectionately nicknamed the Oracle — proclaimed that risks could be handled by the markets themselves.

“Proposals to bring even minimalist regulation were basically rebuffed by Greenspan and various people in the Treasury,” recalled Alan S. Blinder, a former Federal Reserve board member and an economist at Princeton University. “I think of him as consistently cheerleading on derivatives.”

Arthur Levitt Jr., a former chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, says Mr. Greenspan opposes regulating derivatives because of a fundamental disdain for government.

Mr. Levitt said that Mr. Greenspan’s authority and grasp of global finance consistently persuaded less financially sophisticated lawmakers to follow his lead.

“I always felt that the titans of our legislature didn’t want to reveal their own inability to understand some of the concepts that Mr. Greenspan was setting forth,” Mr. Levitt said. “I don’t recall anyone ever saying, ‘What do you mean by that, Alan?’ ”

Still, over a long stretch of time, some did pose questions. In 1992, Edward J. Markey, a Democrat from Massachusetts who led the House subcommittee on telecommunications and finance, asked what was then the General Accounting Office to study derivatives risks.

Two years later, the office released its report, identifying “significant gaps and weaknesses” in the regulatory oversight of derivatives.

“The sudden failure or abrupt withdrawal from trading of any of these large U.S. dealers could cause liquidity problems in the markets and could also pose risks to others, including federally insured banks and the financial system as a whole,” Charles A. Bowsher, head of the accounting office, said when he testified before Mr. Markey’s committee in 1994. “In some cases intervention has and could result in a financial bailout paid for or guaranteed by taxpayers.”

In his testimony at the time, Mr. Greenspan was reassuring. “Risks in financial markets, including derivatives markets, are being regulated by private parties,” he said.

“There is nothing involved in federal regulation per se which makes it superior to market regulation.”

Mr. Greenspan warned that derivatives could amplify crises because they tied together the fortunes of many seemingly independent institutions. “The very efficiency that is involved here means that if a crisis were to occur, that that crisis is transmitted at a far faster pace and with some greater virulence,” he said.

But he called that possibility “extremely remote,” adding that “risk is part of life.”

Later that year, Mr. Markey introduced a bill requiring greater derivatives regulation. It never passed.

Resistance to Warnings

In 1997, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, a federal agency that regulates options and futures trading, began exploring derivatives regulation. The commission, then led by a lawyer named Brooksley E. Born, invited comments about how best to oversee certain derivatives.

Ms. Born was concerned that unfettered, opaque trading could “threaten our regulated markets or, indeed, our economy without any federal agency knowing about it,” she said in Congressional testimony. She called for greater disclosure of trades and reserves to cushion against losses.

Ms. Born’s views incited fierce opposition from Mr. Greenspan and Robert E. Rubin, the Treasury secretary then. Treasury lawyers concluded that merely discussing new rules threatened the derivatives market. Mr. Greenspan warned that too many rules would damage Wall Street, prompting traders to take their business overseas.

“Greenspan told Brooksley that she essentially didn’t know what she was doing and she’d cause a financial crisis,” said Michael Greenberger, who was a senior director at the commission. “Brooksley was this woman who was not playing tennis with these guys and not having lunch with these guys. There was a little bit of the feeling that this woman was not of Wall Street.”

Ms. Born declined to comment. Mr. Rubin, now a senior executive at the banking giant Citigroup, says that he favored regulating derivatives — particularly increasing potential loss reserves — but that he saw no way of doing so while he was running the Treasury.

“All of the forces in the system were arrayed against it,” he said. “The industry certainly didn’t want any increase in these requirements. There was no potential for mobilizing public opinion.”

Mr. Greenberger asserts that the political climate would have been different had Mr. Rubin called for regulation.

In early 1998, Mr. Rubin’s deputy, Lawrence H. Summers, called Ms. Born and chastised her for taking steps he said would lead to a financial crisis, according to Mr. Greenberger. Mr. Summers said he could not recall the conversation but agreed with Mr. Greenspan and Mr. Rubin that Ms. Born’s proposal was “highly problematic.”

On April 21, 1998, senior federal financial regulators convened in a wood-paneled conference room at the Treasury to discuss Ms. Born’s proposal. Mr. Rubin and Mr. Greenspan implored her to reconsider, according to both Mr. Greenberger and Mr. Levitt.

Ms. Born pushed ahead. On June 5, 1998, Mr. Greenspan, Mr. Rubin and Mr. Levitt called on Congress to prevent Ms. Born from acting until more senior regulators developed their own recommendations. Mr. Levitt says he now regrets that decision. Mr. Greenspan and Mr. Rubin were “joined at the hip on this,” he said. “They were certainly very fiercely opposed to this and persuaded me that this would cause chaos.”

Ms. Born soon gained a potent example. In the fall of 1998, the hedge fund Long Term Capital Management nearly collapsed, dragged down by disastrous bets on, among other things, derivatives. More than a dozen banks pooled $3.6 billion for a private rescue to prevent the fund from slipping into bankruptcy and endangering other firms.

Despite that event, Congress froze the Commodity Futures Trading Commission’s regulatory authority for six months. The following year, Ms. Born departed.

In November 1999, senior regulators — including Mr. Greenspan and Mr. Rubin — recommended that Congress permanently strip the C.F.T.C. of regulatory authority over derivatives.

Mr. Greenspan, according to lawmakers, then used his prestige to make sure Congress followed through. “Alan was held in very high regard,” said Jim Leach, an Iowa Republican who led the House Banking and Financial Services Committee at the time. “You’ve got an area of judgment in which members of Congress have nonexistent expertise.”

As the stock market roared forward on the heels of a historic bull market, the dominant view was that the good times largely stemmed from Mr. Greenspan’s steady hand at the Fed.

“You will go down as the greatest chairman in the history of the Federal Reserve Bank,” declared Senator Phil Gramm, the Texas Republican who was chairman of the Senate Banking Committee when Mr. Greenspan appeared there in February 1999.

Mr. Greenspan’s credentials and confidence reinforced his reputation — helping him to persuade Congress to repeal Depression-era laws that separated commercial and investment banking in order to reduce overall risk in the financial system.

“He had a way of speaking that made you think he knew exactly what he was talking about at all times,” said Senator Tom Harkin, a Democrat from Iowa. “He was able to say things in a way that made people not want to question him on anything, like he knew it all. He was the Oracle, and who were you to question him?”

In 2000, Mr. Harkin asked what might happen if Congress weakened the C.F.T.C.’s authority.

“If you have this exclusion and something unforeseen happens, who does something about it?” he asked Mr. Greenspan in a hearing.

Mr. Greenspan said that Wall Street could be trusted. “There is a very fundamental trade-off of what type of economy you wish to have,” he said. “You can have huge amounts of regulation and I will guarantee nothing will go wrong, but nothing will go right either,” he said.

Later that year, at a Congressional hearing on the merger boom, he argued that Wall Street had tamed risk.

“Aren’t you concerned with such a growing concentration of wealth that if one of these huge institutions fails that it will have a horrendous impact on the national and global economy?” asked Representative Bernard Sanders, an independent from Vermont.

“No, I’m not,” Mr. Greenspan replied. “I believe that the general growth in large institutions have occurred in the context of an underlying structure of markets in which many of the larger risks are dramatically — I should say, fully — hedged.”

The House overwhelmingly passed the bill that kept derivatives clear of C.F.T.C. oversight. Senator Gramm attached a rider limiting the C.F.T.C.’s authority to an 11,000-page appropriations bill. The Senate passed it. President Clinton signed it into law.

Pressing Forward

Still, savvy investors like Mr. Buffett continued to raise alarms about derivatives, as he did in 2003, in his annual letter to shareholders of his company, Berkshire Hathaway.

“Large amounts of risk, particularly credit risk, have become concentrated in the hands of relatively few derivatives dealers,” he wrote. “The troubles of one could quickly infect the others.”

But business continued.

And when Mr. Greenspan began to hear of a housing bubble, he dismissed the threat. Wall Street was using derivatives, he said in a 2004 speech, to share risks with other firms.

Shared risk has since evolved from a source of comfort into a virus. As the housing crisis grew and mortgages went bad, derivatives actually magnified the downturn.

The Wall Street debacle that swallowed firms like Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers, and imperiled the insurance giant American International Group, has been driven by the fact that they and their customers were linked to one another by derivatives.

In recent months, as the financial crisis has gathered momentum, Mr. Greenspan’s public appearances have become less frequent.

His memoir was released in the middle of 2007, as the disaster was unfolding, and his book tour suddenly became a referendum on his policies. When the paperback version came out this year, Mr. Greenspan wrote an epilogue that offers a rebuttal of sorts.

“Risk management can never achieve perfection,” he wrote. The villains, he wrote, were the bankers whose self-interest he had once bet upon.

“They gambled that they could keep adding to their risky positions and still sell them out before the deluge,” he wrote. “Most were wrong.”

No federal intervention was marshaled to try to stop them, but Mr. Greenspan has no regrets.

“Governments and central banks,” he wrote, “could not have altered the course of the boom.”